A few months ago, we brought to your attention a case initiated by The Turtles, seeking royalties in New York for the unauthorized performance of their pre-1972 sound recordings. In that decision, the Court of Appeals of New York decided, on a question certified to it by the Second Circuit, that New York state law did not recognize a public performance right in pre-1972 sound recordings. We observed that other courts considering this issue, most notably the Supreme Courts of California and Florida (likewise on certified questions respectively from the Ninth and 11th Circuits) may decide likewise, namely, that under their own state laws, there is no public performance right in pre-1972 sound recordings. We now have the most recent pronouncement from the Florida Supreme Court, handed down on October 26, 2017, confirming our observation by failing to find a public performance right in pre-1972 sound recordings under Florida state law. The Court found that Florida never recognized such a right and that it would be inappropriate for a state court to create a new common law right that should normally be the province of the legislature. Continue Reading
The U.S. Copyright Office is making changes to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) safe harbor agent registration process. The changes impact both new online service providers as well as existing online service providers who have already registered an agent. Read on for details about what you will need to do. Continue Reading
Musical scores incorporated into films are usually produced with the specific film in mind. In the U.S., we call such works “works made for hire,” meaning that the artist does not retain authorship rights to the music. Instead, the commissioning party, which is typically the film producer or music publisher, is the author of the musical score for copyright purposes.
Internationally, however, most countries attribute authorship only to natural persons. To permit the exploitation of collaborative works, like motion pictures, the legal regimes of most of these countries grant the commissioning party the right to exclusively exercise the economic rights in the work. This does not, however, change the status of each individual creator as the “author” of his or her distinct contribution to the work. Continue Reading
This article was originally published on PatentlyO.com.
In Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., the Federal Circuit had its first opportunity to address the impact of the “or otherwise available to the public” clause contained in post-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102. In finding that the AIA “did not change the statutory meaning of ‘on sale’ in the circumstances involved here,” the Federal Circuit provided insight into the continued relevance of the forfeiture doctrine of Metallizing Engineering v. Kenyon Bearing. Continue Reading
Section 411(a) of the Copyright Act generally requires copyright registration, or a refusal of registration, before a copyright action may be filed. This has led to a variety of decisions from the Circuit and District Courts interpreting the meaning of “registration.” It has even led to an intriguing gloss from the Supreme Court, Reed Elsevier, Inc., v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010), holding that Section 411(a) is not a jurisdictional requirement but merely a precondition. The Circuit Courts are now split into three groups, namely, “registration” (registration means what is says…a certificate or refusal in hand), “application” (all elements necessary for registration – an application, deposit copy and fee filed in the Copyright Office) and undecided. None of these positions can easily be harmonized potentially leading to inconsistent results and forum shopping. Continue Reading
Yesterday, in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands, No. 16-341, the United States Supreme Court significantly changed the geography where future patent infringement suits can be filed. The patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C § 1400(b), provides that a patent-infringement lawsuit may be brought either (1) in a State where the defendant resides or (2) where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business. In TC Heartland, the Supreme Court concluded that the “residence requirement” of the patent venue statute refers only to the State of incorporation of domestic corporations. By interpreting “resides” as “is incorporated,” the Supreme Court has significantly restricted where patent owners can file infringement lawsuits.
A recent federal district court decision denied a motion to dismiss a complaint brought by Artifex Software Inc. (“Artifex”) for breach of contract and copyright infringement claims against Defendant Hancom, Inc. based on breach of an open source software license. The software, referred to as Ghostscript, was dual-licensed under the GPL license and a commercial license. According to the Plaintiff, those seeking to commercially distribute Ghostscript could obtain a commercial license to use, modify, copy, and/or distribute Ghostscript for a fee. Otherwise, the software was available without a fee under the GNU GPL, which required users to comply with certain open-source licensing requirements. The requirements included an obligation to “convey the machine-readable Corresponding Source under the terms of this License” of any covered code. In other words, under the open source license option, certain combinations of proprietary software with Ghostscript are governed by the terms of the GNU GPL. Continue Reading
On February 10, 2017, an Illinois federal judge determined that R-Boc Representatives violated an injunction issued following a jury trial on their alleged patent infringement. In a unique opinion replete with quotations from, and references to, literary works written by Kurt Vonnegut Jr., U.S. Magistrate Judge Jeffrey Cole addressed the current standards for determining willfulness under 35 U.S.C. § 284 and finding a case “exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. § 285 en route to awarding the patentee enhanced damages as well as attorneys’ fees.
In a precedential decision, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed that the Patent Trial and Appeal’s Board (PTAB) is required to explicitly state motivations to combine prior-art references in claim rejections for obviousness. Rejections that rely on mere statements that a person of ordinary skill in the art reading the prior-art references would understand that the combination would have allowed for claimed features is not enough.
A patentee may bring patent infringement claims against the United States government pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498, in which Congress waived the sovereign immunity of the United States against such claims. Patent infringement actions against the government are similar to those brought against non-governmental entities, but they do have some idiosyncrasies. For example, patent owners can only sue the government for infringement in the United States Court of Federal Claims, as opposed to a district court, and jury trials are not available in the Court of Federal Claims.