Photo of Edwin Komen

Edwin Komen

Subscribe to Edwin Komen's Posts

Edwin Komen is a partner in the Entertainment, Technology and Advertising and the Intellectual Property Practice Groups.

Contact:Read more about Edwin Komen

Mask Work Infringement

In analogizing semiconductor chips to traditional areas of copyright law, the legislative history notes that, just as a plagiarist who copies only one chapter of a book may be held liable for infringement, a person may be liable for copying a part of a mask work if it is a qualitatively important portion that results in substantial similarity.Continue Reading Protecting Semiconductor Chip Design under the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 (SCPA) – Part II (Infringement and Defense)

Understanding Mask Work

Mask work is a type of intellectual property protection designed to protect layout designs (topographies) of integrated circuits. It is authorized by the federal Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 (SCPA).Continue Reading Protecting Semiconductor Chip Design under the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 (SCPA) – Part I (Registration and Inspection)

The Trademark Modernization Act (TMA) was signed into law on December 27, 2020.  The Act introduces significant amendments to the Lanham Act designed to strengthen the rights of legitimate trademark owners.  The Act makes it easier for trademark owners to obtain injunctive relief in litigation, provides new mechanisms for challenging trademark applications and registrations on the basis of non-use, codifies the letter of protest procedure, and affords the USPTO greater discretion and flexibility in setting deadlines to respond to office actions.
Continue Reading Trademark Modernization Act Strengthens Rights of Trademark Owners

The Second Circuit issued a remarkable decision on termination rights under Sections 203 and 304(c) of the Copyright Act that seemingly, whether knowingly or otherwise, limits the Act’s extraterritorial reach. Ennio Morricone Music Inc. v. Bilio Music Group Ltd., Second Circuit, No 17-3595-cv, decided August 21, 2019 (“Morricone II”). The foregoing provisions of the Copyright Act allow authors to terminate grants after a certain stated period of years, generally after 35 years for grants made by an author. This termination right is unavailable to works-made-for-hire. Identifying the “author” is critical. If “for hire,” the “author” is the employer or commissioning party, and the individual creator, or his or her statutory heirs, may not terminate.
Continue Reading Italian Film Composer “Scores” for Authors

On March 4, 2019, the United States Supreme Court held unanimously that “a copyright claimant may commence an infringement suit … when the Copyright Office registers a copyright.” Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wallstreet.com, LLC. (Slip. Op. at p. 1 (syllabus)). The Court also held unanimously that, upon registration of the copyright, “a copyright owner can recover for infringement that occurred both before and after registration.” Id. This decision resolves a long-standing circuit split between the application approach, which allowed a copyright owner to sue for infringement upon submission of a copyright application, and the registration approach, which allows an infringement suit to proceed only after the Copyright Office granted the registration.  
Continue Reading Supreme Court Holds that a Copyright Claimant May Commence an Infringement Suit Only After the Copyright Office Registers the Copyright

A few months ago, we brought to your attention a case initiated by The Turtles, seeking royalties in New York for the unauthorized performance of their pre-1972 sound recordings. In that decision, the Court of Appeals of New York decided, on a question certified to it by the Second Circuit, that New York state law did not recognize a public performance right in pre-1972 sound recordings. We observed that other courts considering this issue, most notably the Supreme Courts of California and Florida (likewise on certified questions respectively from the Ninth and 11th Circuits) may decide likewise, namely, that under their own state laws, there is no public performance right in pre-1972 sound recordings. We now have the most recent pronouncement from the Florida Supreme Court, handed down on October 26, 2017, confirming our observation by failing to find a public performance right in pre-1972 sound recordings under Florida state law. The Court found that Florida never recognized such a right and that it would be inappropriate for a state court to create a new common law right that should normally be the province of the legislature.
Continue Reading Florida Now Follows New York to Find No Common Law Public Performance Right For Pre-1972 Sound Recordings

Musical scores incorporated into films are usually produced with the specific film in mind. In the U.S., we call such works “works made for hire,” meaning that the artist does not retain authorship rights to the music. Instead, the commissioning party, which is typically the film producer or music publisher, is the author of the musical score for copyright purposes.

Internationally, however, most countries attribute authorship only to natural persons. To permit the exploitation of collaborative works, like motion pictures, the legal regimes of most of these countries grant the commissioning party the right to exclusively exercise the economic rights in the work. This does not, however, change the status of each individual creator as the “author” of his or her distinct contribution to the work.
Continue Reading The Southern District of New York Finds “Work Made For Hire” Under Italian Copyright Law

Section 411(a) of the Copyright Act generally requires copyright registration, or a refusal of registration, before a copyright action may be filed. This has led to a variety of decisions from the Circuit and District Courts interpreting the meaning of “registration.” It has even led to an intriguing gloss from the Supreme Court, Reed Elsevier, Inc., v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010), holding that Section 411(a) is not a jurisdictional requirement but merely a precondition. The Circuit Courts are now split into three groups, namely, “registration” (registration means what is says…a certificate or refusal in hand), “application” (all elements necessary for registration – an application, deposit copy and fee filed in the Copyright Office) and undecided. None of these positions can easily be harmonized potentially leading to inconsistent results and forum shopping.
Continue Reading Eleventh Circuit Joins Split Court Decisions on Registration Precondition for Copyright Suits

On December 20, 2016, the New York Court of Appeals, the highest court in the state, held that no common law public performance right exists for pre-1972 sound recordings. The issue of whether a common law public performance right exists for pre-1972 sound recordings in New York was an issue of first impression. Although this holding is only binding on New York state courts and federal cases decided under New York law, it is anticipated that, coming from a premier IP jurisdiction, it will also be highly influential for courts throughout the nation that are adjudicating or may adjudicate similar cases.
Continue Reading New York Court of Appeals Says No Common Law Public Performance Right For Pre-1972 Sound Recordings

On February 17, 2016, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal by the Central District of California under the California anti-SLAPP statute of a publicity rights claim against the motion picture “The Hurt Locker.”  The plaintiff, Army Sergeant Jeffrey Sarver, an explosive ordnance disposal technician in Iraq, claimed the film appropriated his life story. Sarver v. Chartier, Ninth Circuit, Case No. 11-56986 decided February 17, 2016.
Continue Reading First Amendment SLAPPs Publicity Right Plaintiff in “Hurt Locker” Case

In Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. __ (2014), the United States Supreme Court addressed the role that the equitable defense of laches – i.e., a plaintiff’s unreasonable and prejudicial delay in commencing suit – plays in relation to a claim of copyright infringement filed within the Copyright Act’s three-year statute of limitations period.  There is no doubt that Petrella puts to rest a split amongst the Circuits by clarifying that laches cannot bar a claim for legal relief for infringement occurring within the three-year statutory window.  Yet, Petrella should not be seen as a knock-out punch to the use of laches in copyright actions.  To the contrary, Petrella re-emphasizes the important role that laches plays in connection with the equitable remedies available under the Copyright Act, and provides copyright defendants – and plaintiffs – with guidance as to whether, and to what extent, a plaintiff’s delay in filing suit may limit the availability of those equitable remedies.  Additionally, Petrella’s discussion of a copyright plaintiff’s evidentiary burden and comments about the Copyright Act’s registration requirements raise interesting questions about the impact that a delay in filing suit may have on a plaintiff’s ability to prove infringement.  Laches, it seems, “don’t go down for nobody.”[1]
Continue Reading Laches, Statutes of Limitations and Raging Bull: The Supreme Court Re-Emphasizes The Pitfalls Of Delay In Copyright Cases